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THE MASSACHUSETTS ANTITRUST ACT
A GUIDE FOR THE PRIVATE PRACTITIONER
LOIS M. WOOCHER*
PAUL

A. MANOFF**

I. INTRODUCTION

Business in the 1980's faces increased market pressures, con
tinued conglomerate growth, and intensified government regula
tion. All presage increased utilization of the federal and state anti
trust laws to challenge anticompetitive business behavior. To meet
this need, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts recently enacted
the Massachusetts Antitrust Act, incorporated in the statutes as
chapter 93. 1 Patterned after the federal Sherman and Clayton
Acts,2 this statute substantially modernizes the Commonwealth's
antitrust law by creating new substantive rights, procedural de
vices, and harsh penalties for improper business activities. To en
courage private enforcement, it awards successful claimants up to
three times their actual damages, equitable relief, costs, and rea
sonable attorneys' fees.
The general practitioner, whether representing the large cor
poration or the sole proprietor, will increasingly be required to
counsel clients on the prohibitions of the antitrust laws. Such coun
seling would be incomplete without an awareness of the rights and
proscriptions set forth in chapter 93 of the Massachusetts General
Laws.
This paper introduces chapter 93 to the Massachusetts prac
titioner unfamiliar with this specialized legal field. Included will
be a review of the Act's legislative history, a summary of each pro
vision, a discussion of potential procedural and substantive difficul
* Legal Staff Attorney, J.C. Penney Company, New York, N.Y. Formerly with the
law firm of Brown, Prifti, Leighton and Cohen, Boston, Mass. J.D., Columbia Uni
versity, 1971.
** Private Practitioner, Boston, Mass.; J.D., University of California at Los An
geles, 1973.
The authors Wish to thank Harold Brown, senior partner in Brown, Prifti,
Leighton and Cohen, for his valued assistance in preparing this article.
1. 1978 Mass. Acts, ch. 459; approved July 17, 1978; Emergency declaration
filed August 10, 1978, effective August 17, 1978 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 93, §§ 1-14A (West Cum. Supp. 1980)).
2. See notes 10-24 infra.
11

12

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:11

ties, and proposals for statutory reform. Applying the adage that
an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, counsel may well
benefit from advance study of this new and far-reaching act.

II.
A.

HISTORICAL AND LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND

Resurgence of State Antitrust Activities

The passage of a remodeled antitrust act coincided with the
revitalization of state antitrust activity. Since 1970 alone, well over
thirty states have enacted comprehensive antitrust legislation. 3 This
renaissance was encouraged by four concurrent events: (1) Growing
public awareness that the federal government could not adequately
police local and regional anticompetitive behavior;4 (2) congres
sional authorization for state attorneys general to bring antitrust ac
tions in the federal courts, thereby increasing their involvement
and interest in antitrust regulation;5 (3) the availability of federal
"seed money" for the development of state antitrust divisions;6 and
(4) state participation in several successful multi-party antitrust ac
tions which resulted in large financial recoveries. 7 These led to in
creased political and public support for a continuation of the state's
role as antitrust prosecutor.
3. Such state laws are compiled in [1972] 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 30,000
at 35,011.
4. Together, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the Bureau
of Competition of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) employ fewer than 1,000 at
torneys. These agencies have conceded that they can handle only a fraction of the
country's antitrust matters. See Schellhardt, Merger oj Antitrust Division, FTC Unit
Is Ordered jor Study, Wall St. J., Apr. 11, 1977, at 4, col. 2. Their inadequate staff
and resources are further diminished by the inability of the federal statutes to reach
many local and state anticompetitive practices.
5. Hart-Scotl-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311
1314 (1976) & 18 U.S.C. 1505 (1976). See Fein, Constitutional Issues Raised by the
Parens Patriae Title oj the Antitrust Improvements Act oj 1976:-An Appraisal, 47
ANTITRUST L.J. 1205 (1979); Scher, Emerging Issues Under the Antitrust Improve
ments Act oj 1976, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 679 (1977).
6. The Crime Control Act of 1976 § 309, 42 U.S.C. § 3739 (1976) authorizes the
Antitrust Division of the Justice Department to award grants totalling up to $10 mil
lion per year for three years as "seed money." Pursuant to this program,
Massachusetts has received grants of over $300,000 per year. Congress recently au
thorized an additional $4 million "seed money" appropriation which was not origi
nally sought by the Justice Department. See 943 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA), at D-3 (Dec. 13, 1979).
7. An example is the Tetracycline litigation, West Virginia v. Charles Pfizer &
Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), ajI'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 871 (1971). Economists estimate that direct costs for all types of antitrust vi
olations amount to well over $40 billion per year. See 892 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REp. (BNA) Supp. 1, at 7 (Dec. 7, 1978).
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State antitrust involvement has historical antecedents. Con
trary to popular belief, the states preceded the federal government
in antitrust enforcement. 8 Before the enactment of federal legisla
tion, more than twenty states had statutes proscribing "restraints of
trade." Near the close of the nineteenth century, several states ini
tiated legal actions against the corporate "trusts" then dominating
the business landscape. 9 Despite these efforts, however, the power
of the robber barons expanded, intensifying public antagonism to
their unscrupulous practices. This swelling of public sentiment led
to congressional enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890, the first
federal antitrust law. 10 Although intended merely to supplement
existing state antitrust efforts,l1 the Act virtually resulted in federal
preemption. 12 By the start of World War I, the states had ceased
their antitrust activities, allowing the federal regulators to prose
8. See H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN
AMERICAN TRADITION 155 (1955). By the time the federal Sherman Act was passed
in 1890, 15 other states including Massachusetts had constitutional provisions pro
tecting trade while others had adopted common law prohibitions of monopolies and
trade restraints. See 892 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) Supp. 1, at 12 (Dec.
7, 1978).
9. H. THORELLI, supra note 8, at 259-66.
10. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§
1-7 (1976)).
11. The sponsor of the bill, Senator Sherman, described its purpose as "to sup
plement the enforcement of the established rules of the common and statute law
by the courts of the several states .... It is to arm the Federal courts ... that they
may cooperate with the state courts . . . ." 21 CONGo REC. 2457 (1890). The House
Judiciary Committee report on the bill further noted, "Whatever legislation Congress
may enact on this subject ... will prove of little value unless the states shall supple
ment it by auxiliary and proper legislation...." H.R. REP. No. 1705, 51st Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1890).
12. Federal preemption of the antitrust field is a common defense in state ac
tions. Preemption applies when Congress enacts federal legislation which expressly
or by implication entirely displaces the substantive state law relied on by the claim
ant.
In the antitrust area, Congress has neither expressed this intent, James v. Rath
Packing Co.; 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977), nor implied it, Cloverleaf Butter Co. v.
Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 155 (1942). See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437
U.S. 117, 131-33 (1978); Shell Oil Co. v. Younger, 587 F.2d 34 (9th Cir. 1978), cen.
denied, 440 U.S. 947 (1979).
As the United States District Court for Connecticut recently noted: "Even state
law that prohibits more than federal antitrust statutes is not necessarily in conflict
with, and preempted by, federal law, since the toleration of certain conduct by fed
eral law does not imply an affirmative policy in favor of that conduct." State v. Levi
Strauss & Co., 471 F. Supp. 363, 367 (D. Conn. 1979) (citing 1 P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ~ 208, at 58-59 (1978)). See Commonwealth v. McHugh,
326 Mass. 249, 93 N.E.2d 751 (1950). But see Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers &
Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975), in which federal labor law was held to
preempt state, but not federal antitrust law.
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cute. 13 Not until half a century later did they resume their role as
antitrust protagonist.

B.

The Drafting Process of the Massachusetts Antitrust Act
Prior Massachusetts antitrust law14 had three major weak
nesses; it was substantively inadequate, procedurally cumbersome,
and difficult to interpret. 15 Judicial construction amplified these
shortcomings. A prime example can be found in the holding by the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court that the original statute ap
plied only to commodities and not to services or to intangible prop
erty,16 Accordingly, statutory reform was needed to counteract ju
dicial retrenchment and to protect the unwary public.
The Massachusetts Antitrust Act is a compromise bill reflect
ing contributions by the attorney general,17 the business commu
nity, and consumer groups. The draftsmen were guided by the fed
eral antitrust statutes,18 the model Uniform State Antitrust Act, 19
and recently enacted state antitrust laws. 20 While they recognized
13. It is unclear why state efforts ceased at this time. One theory is that legisla
tures failed to appropriate funds for antitrust enforcement to encourage industries to
locate in their states. See generally Rubin, Rethinking State Antitrust Enforcement,
26 U. FLA. L. REV. 653, 697-98 (1974).
14. The former chapter 93 of the Massachusetts General Laws consisted of nu
merous piecemeal sections which had been enacted in sporadic fashion between
1901 and 1912.
15. For example, former chapter 93, § 2, proscribed monopolistic practices in
14 lines, whereas the present act requires only three. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 93, § 5 (West Cum. Supp. 1980).
16. SDK Medical Computer Servs. Corp. v. Professional Operating Manage
ment Group, Inc., 371 Mass. 117, 354 N.E.2d 852 (1976). The Supreme Judicial
Court's restrictive attitude is further apparent in North Station Wine Co. v. United
Liquors, Ltd., 323 Mass. 48, 80 N.E.2d 1 (1948). Plaintiff's claim that defendant was
engaged in an illegal tying scheme was found immaterial. Id.
17. The Attorney General had been trying to obtain enactment of a new anti
trust act since 1974. Failure to do so may have been attributable to the vigorous en
forcement provisions of the proposed drafts.
18. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
12-27, as amended by Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976).
19. Uniform State Antitrust Act, approved in 1973 by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and by the ABA House of Delegates, re
printed in [1974] 4 TRADE REG. REp. (CCH) ~ 30,101 at 35,151. The model act has
not gained wide acceptance.
20. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN., §§ 35-24 to -45 (West Cum. Supp. 1980);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 356:1-14 (West Cum. Supp. 1979); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
56:9-1 to :9-19 (West Cum. Supp. 1980); VA. CODE §§ 59.1-9.1 to -9.18 (Michie Cum.
Supp. 1979). These state laws exhibit little uniformity. While varying substantially,
they generally follow three patterns: (1) Employ broad langauge patterned on the
Sherman Act; (2) more specifically proscribe "trusts and combinations," which seek
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that a remodeled antitrust act would probably be enacted, there
was little consensus on specific provisions. The senate's draft ap
peared to favor big business. The public interest lobby regarded it
as weak, inadequate, and even dangerous since it imposed serious
restrictions on the right to recover damages under chapter 93A for
"unfair methods of competition. "21 In return for eliminating these
restrictions, they agreed to accept the draft's severely deficient ju
risdictional and exemption sections. Based on this compromise, the
revised bill received the strong support of legislative leaders, sail
ing through with little discussion 22 before being speedily approved
by the Governor.23
III.

THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER

93

Section 1: Title; Purpose; and Construction
Section 1 declares that chapter 93 is to be known as the Mass
achusetts Antitrust Act. 24 Its purpose is "to encourage free and
open competition in the interests of the general welfare and econ
omy by prohibiting unreasonable restraints of trade and monopo
listic practices in the commonwealth." Significantly, the Act "shall
be construed in harmony with judicial interpretations of comparable
federal antitrust statutes insofar as practicable."25 While this lan

A.

to fix prices, monopolize, or limit the quantity of goods; or (3) very specifically enu
merate a list of prohibited practices.
21. Pursuant to chapter 93A, § 11, a businessperson may sue for "unfair meth
ods of competition," which is the same standard as in § 5 of the Federal Trade Com
mission Act, IS U.S.C. § 45(a) (1976). Section 5(a) has been held to reach incipient as
well as actual antitrust violations. See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966);
note 98 infra.
22. State Senator Jack Backman introduced several amendments to strengthen
the legislation. On the basis of the compromises by public and private interests, they
were withdrawn without formal vote. The legislative history reflects no other
discussion of the bill. As is frequently the case in Massachusetts, this vacuum es
chews guidance for the intended meaning of particular provisions. The reactions of
the consumer and business groups to the Senate bill were expressed in several let
ters to the state's weekly legal publication. See Ravech, Proposed Mass. Antitrust
Act Creates Problems, 6 MASS. LAw. WEEKLY 749, at 9 (June 5, 1978); Goldberg, A
Differing View of the Mass. Antitrust Act, 6 MASS. LAW. WEEKLY 829, at 5 (June 26,
1978); Ravech, Goldberg Letter is Not the Answer to Problems of Mass. Antitrust, 6
MASS. LAW. WEEKLY 849 at 5 (July 3, 1978).
23. The compromise drafting process may explain chapter 93's frequent ambi
guity. As with the federal statutes, clarification appears to have been intentionally
left to the courts.
24. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 93, § I (West Cum. Supp. 1980).
25. Id. (emphasis added). Generally, the federal antitrust statutes are regarded
as the Sherman and Clayton Acts, (Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976);
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guage strictly limits judicial discretion, it also provides the Act with
a ready-made history by reference to the voluminous body of fed
eral antitrust case law. This corresponds to chapter 93A's guidance
from federal decisions interpreting the substantive provision of the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act. Since chapter 93A specifies
that Massachusetts courts are only to be guided by federal prece
dents, allowance is available for interpretive differences which con
sider the Commonwealth's unique perspective.
The legislative history of chapter 93 reflects the different con
struction standards of these two sister statutes. The senate draft of
chapter 93 sought to conform chapter 93A to chapter 93's "in har
mony" standard and to shift chapter 93A's basis from the FTC Act
to the federal antitrust laws. As the latter are not so sweeping, this
proposal would have seriously narrowed chapter 93A's reach. Since
business conduct may be subject to review under both statutes,
proponents contended that different and potentially inconsistent
standards of legality should not be applied. Opponents countered
that amending chapter 93A was unnecessary, contrary to the analo
gous federal scheme, and would seriously weaken the Act by nar
rowing its reach. In its final version, chapter 93 did not curtail the
scope of chapter 93A.
B.

Section 2: Definitions

The definitions adopted in section 2 generally reflect the com
promise origins of chapter 93. For example, the term "trade or
commerce," while including advertising and leasing, specifically ex
cludes the conveyance, transfer, or use of real property.26 Clearly
Clayton Act, § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976)), but not the Federal Trade Commission Act,
15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1976). Bott v. Holiday Universal, Inc., [1976-2] TRADE CAS. (CCH)
~ 60,973 at 69,301 (D.D.C.). A recent case illustrating the scope of the "in hannony"
standard is State v. Lawn King, Inc., 169 N.J. Super. 346,404 A.2d 1215 (App. Div.
1979), aff'd, 978 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), at F-l (Aug. 21, 1980). In
this case, New Jersey's first criminal convictions under its remodeled antitrust statute
were reversed. The basis for this reversal was that the trial court had not acted "in
harmony" with federal law. In reviewing the vertical price fixing and tying claims,
the court applied a per se standard instead of the "rule of reason." Interestingly, at
the time of the lower court's ruling, the federal courts also used the per se test. The
New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed, noting that it was proceeding with the
"greatest caution" because of the criminal nature of the case. [d.
26. The banks' lobbying efforts may have been encouraged by the Supreme Ju
dicial Court's failure to resolve the issue of chapter 93A's application to banks. See
Mechanics Nat'l Bank of Worcester v. Killein, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 129, 384 N.E.2d
1231, 1237 (1979). However, since insurance companies, Dodd v. Commercial Union
Ins. Co., 373 Mass. 72 (1977), 365 N.E.2d 802 (1977), and public utilities, Lowell Gas
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differing from both the statutory and judicial application of chapter
93A,27 this limitation may be explained by intense lobbying from
the banking community.
C.

Section 3: Jurisdiction

Section 3 establishes the Act's jurisdictional28 reach, em
phasizing its "regional" nature. The Act applies· only to activities
that impact primarily within the Commonwealth. Procedurally, if a
defendant establishes that it derives more than ten percent of its
gross revenues from interstate commerce outside New England,
the burden of establishing jurisdiction shifts to the complaining
party.

Co. v. Attorney Gen. of Mass., 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 49, 385 N.E.2d 240 (1979), have
been held to be subject to chapter 93A, banks may also lie within the jurisdiction of
chapter 93A.
27. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 9(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1980); Heller v.
Silverbranch Constr. Corp., 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2850, 382 N.E.2d 1065 (1978); Com
monwealth v. De Cotis, 366 Mass. 234, 316 N.E.2d 748 (1974).
28. Our federalist system can be seen as distributing jurisdiction along a con
tinuum, with the states and federal government comprising the two opposite ends.
Determinations of placement on this spectrum are subject to the constitutional prin
ciples embodied in the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, the Supremacy
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, and the fourteenth amendment's procedural due pro
cess requirements (e.g., minimum contacts must exist between the forum state and the
defendant for the purposes of in personam jurisdiction. See International Shoe v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)). This continuum can be divided into three head
ings: (1) Exclusive state jurisdiction, (2) exclusive federal jurisdiction, and (3) concur
rent federal/state jurisdiction. The first applies to wholly intrastate activities and
rests on the states' general police authority to regulate wholly local commerce. See
National Cotton Oil Co. v~ Texas, 197 U.S. U5 (1905). The second correspondingly
applies to wholly interstate activities. The limits of both have been considerably nar
rowed by the judiciary's expanded definition of interstate and intrastate commerce.
Consequently, the third heading comprising the middle range has been increasingly
broadened. State jurisdiction now reaches interstate restraints with "significant local
consequences" or a "local nexus." See Rubin, Rethinking State Antitrust Enforce
ment, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 653, 676 (1974); 892 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA), Supp. 1, at U (Dec. 7, 1978). Federal jurisdiction reaches basically intrastate
restraints which "substantially affect interstate commerce." McLain v. Real Estate
Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 100 S. Ct. 502, 509 (1980).
State jurisdiction over anticompetitive practices therefore is subject to the fol
lowing three limitations: (1) Significant local nexus; (2) no unreasonable burden on
or discrimination against interstate commerce; and (3) no conflict with affirmative
federal policy. Federal jurisdiction in turn covers activities which (1) occur within
the flow of interstate commerce, or (2) substantially affect interstate commerce.
Clearly there is a substantial area of overlap wherein both federal and state agencies
are empowered to act. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1971), afrdon
other grounds, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Woods Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
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The statute thus focuses on two separate and conjunctive
standards, the geographic location where the act occurred and its
primary area of impact. Numerous questions are raised as to the
construction and scope of these two tests. For example, the term
"occur" is subject to several interpretations. If two competitors
fixed prices of a commodity in California, with the commodity be
ing manufactured in Wisconsin and sold in Massachusetts, did the
illegal act occur in California, Wisconsin, or Massachusetts? More
over, if it occurred in Massachusetts, must claimant also establish
that sales occurred "primarily and predominantly"29 within the Com
monwealth by showing that more than fifty percent of claimant's
business derived from Massachusetts? Similar issues also arise con
cerning the meaning of "competitive impact." Perhaps these words
can be construed as requiring only a showing of a "substantial ef
fect on intrastate commerce." This ambiguity, however, not only pro
vides little guidance for the prospective litigant, but invites defensive
delaying tactics pending more definitive judicial construction.
The "commerce" requirement is expected to raise substantial
evidentiary difficulties for victims. Much time and effort might be
expended in establishing the corollary elements of jurisdiction. As
a result, claimants may find themselves embroiled in economic bat
tles over the delineation of an activity's primary impact area30
rather than in litigating the merits of the action.
If a claimant successfully overcomes the commerce impedi
ment, the jurisdictional prerequisites still remain. This constitutes
a negative hurdle, namely to establish that the challenged conduct
has not been the subject of a formal investigation, proceeding or
other assertion of federal jurisdiction by the FTC, the United States
Department of Justice, or other federal agency.
This provision may immunize anticompetitive conduct re
viewed summarily by a federal agency. This federal preemption ap

29. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 93, § 3 (West Cum. Supp. 1980).
30. Section 3 is crucial to the Act's effectiveness. Yet, in addition to being am
biguous, it appears unnecessarily weak. Somewhat broader is chapter 93A, § 3, which
exempts defendants who derive at least 20% of their gross revenue from transactions
in interstate commerce except if the challenged transactions "occur primarily and
substantially within the Commonwealth." An allegation that at least one such act has
occurred in Massachusetts may satisfy chapter 93A jurisdiction over a large national
company. In re Yankee Milk, Inc., 372 Mass. 353, 362 N.E.2d 207 (1977). It is un
likely that a claimant can Similarly satisfy the additional jurisdictional test of chapter
93 as to "local" impact.
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pears unnecessarily broad. It may, for example, embrace patently
offensive practices peremptorily investigated by a federal agency
which then elected not to pursue the matter for any number of
nonsubstantive reasons. These might include the reasoning that the
perpetrating company was engaged primarily in intrastate, re
gional, or nationally insubstantial commerce; the agency's limited
resources are to be focused on other types of restraints or relation
ships, for example, ones which are horizontal as opposed to verti
cal;31 or that the agency lacked the necessary remedial authority
and therefore chose to defer to other regulators.
Considerable redrafting of section 3 might well be warranted
to eliminate the overly restrictive jurisdictional barriers. Instead of
attempting to exclude conduct in interstate commerce, the Com
monwealth should extend its jurisdiction to constitutional limits. 32
This would better achieve the Act's goal of encouraging and pro
tecting fair and unfettered competition. Litigation thus would be
freed from unnecessary restrictions, fostering those local cases
which have been substantially ignored in federal enforcement by
the Antitrust Division and the FTC.33
D.

Sections 4, 5, and 6: The Substantive Provisions

The substantive heart of the statute lies in sections 4, 5, and
6, which parallel the federal antitrust laws. Echoing section 1 of
the Sherman Act,34 section 4 declares: "Every contract, combina
tion in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce in the commonwealth shall be unlawful." Viola
tions would occur where two or more separate entities agree to fix
31. Reportedly, several years ago the Justice Department made a policy deci
sion to shift its antitrust efforts from vertical to horizontal conduct. However, the
new head of the Antitrust Division, Sanford Litvack, recently stated that the Justice
Department will give a new emphasis to vertical cases. The FTC which has been fo
cusing on horizontal arrangements, may likewise be shifting its emphasis. 955 ANTI
TRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), at A-2 (Mar. 13, 1980).
32. In passing the Sherman Act, Congress intended "to go to the utmost extent
of its constitutional power in restraining trust and monopoly agreements." United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriter Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944). See also Exxon
Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,
310 U.S. 469 (1940).
33. Other states have not adopted a restrictive approach to the coverage of their
antitrust laws. Some have extended jurisdiction to the limits of long-arm statutes and
the fourteenth amendment. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-24 to -45 (West Cum.
Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325.801-28 (West Cum. Supp. 1980) and N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 356:1-14 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
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prices 35 at the horizontal36 or vertical level,37 to divide the market
between competitors,38 to boycott competitors,39 to tie the sale of
a desired item with the purchase of another less desired item, 40to
restrain a distributor's territory, 41 or to otherwise unreasonably re
strain trade. 42
Modeled on section 2 of the Sherman Act,43 section 5 states:
"It shall be unlawful for any person or persons to monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize or combine or conspire with any other per
son or persons to monopolize any part of trade or commerce in the
commonwealth." Without requiring a combination of two or more
persons, it prohibits unitary conduct by a firm acting alone which
results in its obtaining monopoly power, that is, power to control
prices or to exclude competition,44 or raises the dangerous proba
bility that it will achieve such power. 45
35. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Morrison v.Nissan Mo
tor Co., 601 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1979).
36. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978); Na
tional Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
37. See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911); Eastern Scientific Co.
v. Wild Heerbrugg Instruments, Inc., 572 F.2d 883 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
833 (1978).
38. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898),
modified and afI'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); Engine Specialities, Inc. v. Bombardier,
Ltd., 605 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1979).
39. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531 (1978); Klor's Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators' Guild, Inc. v.
FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Cernuto v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir.
1979); Erewhon, Inc. v. Northeast Health Food Merchants, 428 F. Supp. 551 (D.
Mass. 1977). But see Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978).
40. See United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. (Fortner II), 429
U.S. 610 (1977); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Anderson
Foreign Motors, Inc. v. New England Toyota Distrib., Inc., 475 F. Supp. 973 (D.
Mass. 1979).
41. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); United
States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
42. Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombardier, Ltd., 605 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1979);
George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Bldrs., Inc., 508 F.2d 547 (1st Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
44. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); United States
v. E.I. Dupont DeNemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956); Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. I (1911); Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 481 F. Supp.
965 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
45. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905); Agrashell, Inc. v. Ham
mons Prods. Co., 479 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1022 (1973).
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Section 6, based on section 3 of the Clayton Act,46 forbids ex
clusive supply and similar arrangements. In "tying" arrangements,
prohibited by this section and by section 4 of the Massachusetts
Act, a seller illegally conditions the sale of one product, the tying
product, on the buyer's purchase of a second product, the tied
product. 47 An exclusive dealing arrangement involves an unreason
able commitment by a buyer to deal with one specific seller to the
detriment of competing sellers.48 Section 6 differs from the general
proscriptions of section 4 in two ways: it applies only to the sale or
lease of tangible commodities; and it prohibits acts whose effect
may be either to substantially lessen competition or to tend to cre
ate a monopoly. Section 3 of the Clayton Act was intended to ar
rest in its incipiency conduct which in time might develop into a
violation of section 1 or section 2 of the Sherman Act. 49 The same
distinction underlies the state provision.
This discussion of sections 4, 5, and 6 of the Massachusetts Act
merely touches on the scope and meaning of these sections. There
are almost one hundred years of interpretive federal court deci
sions construing the simple statutory language of the federal anti
trust laws. 50 To understand the substantive heart of chapter 93,
practitioners must familiarize themselves with the large body of
federal antitrust case law. 51
46. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976).
47. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608-609
(1953).
48. Magnus Petroleum Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 599 F.2d 196 (7th Cir.) cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 231 (1979); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320
(1961); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
49. FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966). Professor Sullivan of the Uni
versity of California Law School suggests the courts have apparently reduced the
Sherman threshold to the Clayton level, and therefore there is no meaning to this
fine distinction. L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 440 (1977).
50. Antitrust source materials include: Commerce Clearing House (CCH) Trade
Regulation Reporter, a five-volume looseleaf service for the antitrust field; ABA,
Antitrust Law Developments with second supplement (1st ed. 1975), a one-volume
summary; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 49, a hornbook; Bureau of National Affairs
(BNA), Antitrust & Trade Regulation Reports, (ATRR), a wp.ekly newsletter on cur
rent developments in the antitrust and trade regulation area; J. VON KALINOWSKI,
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION (Matthew Bender,
1980), a IS-volume treatise, and P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW (1978) a
three-volume treatise.
51. The federal antitrust laws do not always mean what they appear to say. For
example, in referring to sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, Prof. Sullivan notes
that: "[N]either has been read literally. The scope of each of these provisions has
been narrowed through standing requirements invented and elaborated upon by the
courts." L. SULLIVAN, supra note 49, at 770. For example, the Sherman Act's refer
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E.

Section 7: Exemptions
Section 7 exempts three broad categories of conduct. Conduct
is not included if: (1) Exempt from the federal antitrust statutes52
or the FTC Act;53 (2) subject to federal or state regulation or su
pervision; or (3) authorized or approved by federal, state, or local
law. 54 If applied literally, this section would threaten to eviscerate
ence in § 1 to "Every contract, combination . . ." has been defined to mean
only contracts or combinations which unnreasonably restrain competition. Northern
Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958); Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911). In addition, the Clayton Act's remedy provision has
confined standing to persons sustaining "antitrust" injuries, that is, injuries of the
kind the antitrust laws were intended to prevent. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl
O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977). Certain unique principles have also been judicially
created, the most significant being the per se and "rule of reason" tests. The former
holds that conduct can be found illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the harm it
has caused or the business excuse for its use, if it is so pernicious in its effect on
competition as to have no redeeming virtue. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1, 5 (1958). Examples of per se illegal conduct include horizontal price fixing,
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); vertical price fixing,
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); market allocation, United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified and aff'd, 175 U.S.
211 (1899); certain types of tying arrangements, Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947);
and group boycotts, Fashion Originators' Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). In
contrast, the "rule of reason" requires an elaborate inquiry into anticompetitive ef
fects. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S.
1, 59-60 (1911); Eiberger v. Sony Corp., 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1980). In summary,
while antitrust law incorporates many common law principles, it also has developed
its own unique doctrines. Many of these doctrines may be adopted by the Massa
chusetts judiciary.
52. The McCarran-Ferguson Insurance Regulation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015
(1976), exempts the "business of insurance" from the antitrust laws. See Group Life
& Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979). Recent conflicting circuit
decisions indicate that the construction of this limited exemption is not uniform. Lib
erty Glass Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 607 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1979); Bartholomew v.
Virginia Chiropractors Ass'n, 612 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1979).
53. Clayton Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976); Capper-Volstead Agricultural Pro
ducers' Associations Act § 1, 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-292 (1976). See National Broiler Mktg.
Ass'n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816 (1978); Maryland & Virginia Milk Prod. Ass'n v.
United States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960). Congress is considering exempting agricultural
cooperatives from the FTC Act. This apparently would doom several current FTC in
vestigations, including those, for example, concerning Sunkist and Ocean Spray. S.
265, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
54. By comparison, other states have limited exemptions. Connecticut, for ex
ample, exempts acts mandated by other Connecticut or federal laws. CONN. GEN..
STAT. ANN. 35-24 to -45 (West Cum. Supp. 1980). Several states have taken the ap
proach of excluding specific industries. New Jersey, for example, exempts utilities,
insurance companies, banks, and security dealers. See N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. 56:9-5
(West Cum. Supp. 1980). Massachusetts expands on both these approaches by
excluding actions of any industry if approved by a state agency.
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the statute. For example, chapter 93 would not reach joint rateset
ting where permitted by state regulations. This holds true even if
these regulations were proposed by the regulated industry, per
functorily reviewed by the enforcing agency, and adopted without
any consideration of their antitrust effects.
Under present federal standards such pro forma approval
would not exempt such conduct from Sherman Act scrutiny. The
state action exemption first announced in Parker v. Brown 55 has
been severely restricted during the past five years. In Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona,56 the United States Supreme Court identi
fied four factors which support a finding of state action immunity.
Immunity will be found when there is a clearly defined state pol
icy, formulation to advance valid state interests, implementation
by state action compelling the questioned practice, and active su
pervision by the state. State acquiescence alone is not sufficient. 57

55. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). In Parker, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a
California raisin price maintenance program challenged as violative of the Com
merce Clause and, at the Court's own urging, of the Sherman Act. While holding ex
empt from the Sherman Act a state-mandated program for marketing agricultural
products, the Supreme Court in Parker also commented that "a state does not give
immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or
by declaring that their action is lawful ...." Id. at 351.
56. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). The Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of
state-action immunity in California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc., 100 S. Ct. 937 (1980). After analyzing Parker and its progeny, Justice Powell,
writing for the majority, wrote:
These decisions establish two standards for antitrust immunity under Parker
v. Brown. First, the challenged restraint must be 'one clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed as state policy'; second, the policy must be 'actively
supervised' by the State itself. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978).
Id. at 943. The opinion continues, outlining the factors which persuaded the
Court to strike down California's statutory scheme for regulating wine prices:
The California system for wine pricing satisfies the first standard. The
legislative policy is forthrightly stated and clear in its purpose to permit re
sale price maintenance. The program, however, does not meet the second
requirement for Parker immunity. The State simply authorizes price-setting
and enforces the prices established by private parties. The State neither es
tablishes prices nor reviews the reasonableness of the price schedules; nor
does it regulate the terms of fair trade contracts. The State does not monitor
market conditions or engage in any "pointed reexamination" of the program.
The national policy in favor of competition cannot be thwarted by casting
such a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a private
price fixing arrangement. As Parker teaches, "a state does not give immunity
to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by
declaring that their action is lawful."
Id. at 943-44 (quoting Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943)) (footnote omitted).
57. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976). See also Fischer, Spuhl,
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Moreover, this rule applies to actions of municipal subdivisions, 58
as well as to state entities. Massachusetts courts may be expected
to follow a similarly restrictive approach. This would serve to pro
mote the legislative purpose of free and open competition in the
interests of the general welfare and economy. 59

Section 8: Investigations by the Attorney General
Modeled on the Justice Department's Antitrust Civil Process
Act,60 section 8 defines the attorney general's investigative pow
ers. Prior to the commencement of any legal action, whenever the
attorney general has "reasonable cause to believe"61 that a viola
tion has been, is, or will be engaged in, he may issue compulsory
process, such as civil investigative demands, to require document
production, interrogatory answers, and oral testimony. Unlike the
corresponding federal act, however, civil investigative demands can
be served only on targets and not on third party witnesses. 62 The
person served is entitled to petition the superior court for an ap
propriate protective order.
Documents obtained in the course of an investigation are to be
kept confidential. In contrast with federal procedures,63 they are
F.

Herzwunn & Assoc., Inc. v. Forrest T. Jones & Co., 586 S.W.2d 310 (MD. Sup. Ct.
1979).
58. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
59. This would require narrowing § 7's sweeping language to immunize only
those state-action activities actively regulated or legislatively mandated.
The Supreme Judicial Court has narrowly construed chapter 93A's correspond
ing provision. In a recent chapter 93A case, the court wrote:
We reject the argument that an act Dr practice which is authorized by statute
can never be an unfair or deceptive act Dr practice.... The fact that particu
lar conduct is pennitted by statute or by common law principles should be
considered, but it is not conclusive on the question of unfairness.
Schubach v. Household Fin. Corp., 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1153, 376 N.E.2d 140, 142
(1978). See also Lowell Gas Co. v. Attorney Gen. of Mass., 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 49, 385
N.E.2d 240 (1979), in which the court held that chapter 93A applied to a public util
ity's unfair conduct even though it had been approved by a state regulatory agency.
60. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314 (1976), as amended by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Anti
trust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976), which em
powers federal officials to make pre-complaint demands for relevant materials.
61. The Supreme Court has agreed to decide whether federal courts have juris
diction to determine if the FTC has complied with its statutory mandate that, prior to
issuing a complaint, it "exercises the act of deciding" if it has the requisite "reason
to believe" that there has been a violation of the FTC Act. FTC v. Standard Oil Co.
of Cal., 596 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1077 (1980).
62. A target's compliance with a civil investigative demand will not be excused
on statutory exemption grounds. In re Application of Ajello V. Moffie, 944 ANTI
TRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), at D-l (Conn. Sup. Ct. 1979).
63. Freedom of Infonnation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976). Standards for access to
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not subject to disclosure under the Massachusetts Freedom of In
formation Act64 except to government officials for antitrust enforce
ment purposes only.65 When a case is closed, these documents are
to be returned to the person who provided them. The effect of this
protection is twofold. While encouraging voluntary compliance
with civil investigative demands,66 these provisions correspond
ingly discourage subsequent bootstrap litigation founded on infor
mation contained in government acquired documents.
While section 8 substantially increases the attorney general's
investigative authority, it must be read in context with the Act's
other provisions. 67 Considering chapter 93's major jurisdictional
hurdles, the attorney general may elect to use chapter 93's inves
tigative procedures but then file a complaint in United States Dis
trict Court alleging federal antitrust violations. 68 By following this
strategy, he utilizes the strengths of both the federal and state
schemes. Moreover, under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, he
may incorporate in the federal complaint related chapter 93 and
chapter 93A claims. 69
.
grand jury testimony in a Justice Department action are discussed in Douglas Oil
Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 221 (1979).
64. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 66, § 10 (West Cum. Supp. 1980).
65. The Attorney General may disclose "confidential" information to federal of
ficials. These officials must give reasonable assurances that they will not release the
documents to other persons. This limited exception furthers the strong policy fa
voring state and. federal law enforcement cooperation. See; e.g., Martin Marietta
Corp. v. FTC, 475 F. Supp. 338 (D. D.C. 1979) (holding that a state agency may have
access to the transcript of a deposition taken by the FTC); Interco, Inc. v. FTC, 478
F. Supp. 103 (D.D.C. 1979) (holding that the FTC may disclose to state attorneys
general documents constituting trade secrets or customer lists); United States v.
Campbell Hardware, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 430 (D. Mass. 1979). Section 4 of the Clayton
Act requires the U.S. Attorney General to notify state attorneys general of Justice
Department actions which may warrant comparable state antitrust proceedings, and
to share certain related files and materials with these state officers. The policy fa
voring ongoing federal-state cooperation underlies chapter 93A's requirement that
notice first be given to the FTC of certain proposed state actions.
66. Targets are more likely to comply voluntarily with a civil investigative de
mand request if third parties will not be afforded access to the produced documents.
67. During the drafting stage, the Attorney General appeared to accept the
Act's weaker sections (e.g., §§ 3 & 7) in exchange for passage of §§ 8 and 14. See text
accompanying notes 17-23 supra.
68. The Multidistrict Litigation Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976), may assist the At
torney General during the discovery phase since it authorizes the federal courts to
transfer cases involving common questions of fact or law to a single district for
coordinated and consolidated pre-trial proceedings provided the transfer promotes
the convenience of the parties and the just and efficient conduct of the proceedings.
69. See UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S .. 715 (1966); C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 3566 (Supp. 1979). The
Gibbs case outlined a two-step approach. First, the court must determine if it has the
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Section 9: Parens Patriae Suits

Modeled on the federal parens patriae act,70 section 9 author
izes the attorney general to bring parens patriae suits for section
4 violations.71 In these actions the attorney general may bring
civil actions on behalf of the state's citizens who have been injured
by the anticompetitive practice. Parens patriae suits are analogous
to consumer class actions, in that each person may have sustained
only minimal monetary damage but the aggregate amount may be
quite substantial. Parens patriae suits, however, are not encum
bered by the attendant procedural impediments of class action
power to exercise pendent jurisdiction. It must find that: (1) There is a substantial
federal claim; (2) the state and federal claims derive from a common nucleus of oper
ative facts; and (3) the claims are the kind that a plaintiff would ordinarily be ex
pected to try together. Having answered each affirmatively, the court then decides if
it ought to exercise this power.
In Kaminski v. Shawmut Credit Union, 416 F. Supp. 1119 (D. Mass. 1976), a fed
eral Truth in Lending Act suit, the United States District Court accepted pendent ju
risdiction over related chapter 93A claims.
70. The Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314 (1976), as amended by Hart
Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383
(1976), authorizes state attorneys general to sue in federal court on behalf of state cit
izens injured by Sherman Act violations. See H. Brown, Practice Comment, MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93 (West Cum. Supp. 1980). See also Fein, supra note 5; Scher,
supra note 5.
This federal statute represents the Congressional response to two judicial rul
ings. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972), was an action brought by the
state's Attorney General for injury to Hawaii's general economy. California v. Frito
Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 774 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973), similarly sought
relief for the state's citizens. Both parens patriae actions were founded on common
law principles. Both failed by not stating a proper cause of action. The courts inti
mated that such a novel type of suit must rest on legislative authorization. Shortly
thereafter, Congress amended the Clayton Act to provide this authority.
71. In enacting the Parens Patriae Act, the Congressional objective was to de
ter antitrust violations while providing a practical and effective remedy for persons
injured by Sherman Act violations. Obtaining legal redress for these violations was
often frustrated by evidentiary, procedural, and financial obstacles created by court
decisions, especially those restricting consumer class actions. See Oppenheimer
Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978) (holding that, except in unusual circum
stances, the burden of identifying, not hotifying, class members in a FED. R. CIV. P.
23(b)(3) class action rests with the plaintiff); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S.
720 (1977) (limiting price fixing standards to direct purchasers); Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (imposing stringent notice standards). But see Reiter
v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979), in which consumers were held to have stand
ing as injury to their pocketbook satisfied the required statutory element of injury to
"property." On remand, the District Court of Minnesota held that the consumer who
purchased the price-fixed hearing aid could sue the manufacturer as well as the re
tail seller as both were conspirators in the resale price maintenance scheme. Conse
quently, the consumer was not an "indirect purchaser." Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,
486 F. Supp. 115 (D. Minn. 1980).
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suits.72 Individuals may elect to exclude themselves from the bene
fits of this litigation, thereby preserving their right to file separate
actions. Accordingly, final judgment will not have res judicata ef
fect upon those individuals.
The attorney general may sue for injuries to the Common
wealth caused by violations of sections 4, 5, and 6. Actual damages
may be trebled if malicious intent73 to injure the state is shown. In
addition, the Act facilitates the calculation of damages. In price
fixing cases it pennits damages to be proved and assessed in the
aggregate by use of statistical or sampling methods. This eliminates
the evidentiary obstacle of proving the identity and amount of in
jury suffered by individual victims. Moneys recovered are distrib
uted as determined by the court. Civil penalties of up to $25,000
may also be sought by· the attorney general. Money recovered in
this manner is deposited as a civil penalty in the Antitrust Enforce
ment Fund. 74

H.

Section 10: Remedies

As with the Sherman Act, chapter 93 provides for criminal
sanctions. Violations are misdemeanors if they are knowing
breaches of sections 4 or 5, and are engaged in with specific intent
to injure any person. In a criminal antitrust action, therefore, the
claimant may be required to establish defendant's state of mind or
intent. 75 Once established, violations are remedied in two ways.
72. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. This avoids the manageability and evidentiary prob
lems associated with proving injury to identifiable individuals. Often this require
ment proved to be impractical, if not impossible.
73. This standard would appear to seriously impair the Act's deterrent intent.
74. To date, only a few parens patriae actions have been filed by state attorneys
general in either state or federal courts. There are a number of reasons for this re
straint. These include lack of clarification on the scope of Illinois Brick Co. v. Illi
nois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), and constitutional issues concerning the act itself. To date,
such constitutional challenges have been unsuccessful. See Fein, supra note 5.
75. In United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978), the Su
preme Court held that in criminal price-fixing cases:
[A] defendant's state of mind or intent is an element of a criminal anti
trust offense which must be established by evidence and inferences drawn
therefrom and cannot be taken from the trier of fact through reliance on a le
gal presumption of wrongful intent from proof of an effect on prices.... We
are unwilling to construe the Sherman Act as mandating a regime of strict li
ability for criminal offenses.
ld. at 435-36. This intent element may be satisfied by a showing that the conduct
was undertaken with the specific purpose of producing anticompetitive effects or
with knowledge of its probable consequences. The Gypsum rule should not affect
the usual price-fixing case (e.g., agreements to fix price increases or bid rigging). See
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First, fines of $100,000 for a corporation or $25,000 for individuals
may be imposed. Second, jail sentences of one year may be or
dered. 76
I.

Section 11: Effect of Judgments

Section 11 provides that a final judgment in an action brought
by the attorney general may be used as prima facie evidence in
subsequent third party actions against the same defendant, pro
vided the issues are the same. This mirrors the rule employed in
federal antitrust actions.
Litigants also may introduce final judgments for offensive as
well as defensive collateral estoppel purposes. This is permitted
when there is no mutuality of parties, provided the opposing party
has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claims. Therefore,
rather than creating a mere presumption in one's favor, this proce
dure precludes relitigation of the same issues. 77

J.

Section 12: Private Right of Action

Section 12 is the key provision for private claimants. Modelled
on section 4 of the Clayton Act, it authorizes "[a]ny person who
shall be injured in his business or property by reason of a violation
United States v. Foley, 598 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 727,
728 (1980); United States v. Society of Independent Gasoline Mktrs., 945 ANTITRUST
& TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), at A-17 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Brighton Bldg.
& Maintenance Co., 598 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 79, 80
(1980). For a discussion of the Justice Department's criteria in selecting antitrust
cases for criminal prosecution see Baker, To Indict or Not to Indict: Pmsecutorial
Discretion in Sherman Act Enforcement, 63 Cornell L. Rev. 405 (1978). In addition,
some states have enacted novel remedy provisions. For example, New Jersey pro
vides for discretionary charter revocation and precludes a convicted individual from
owning or managing a business. N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 56:9-7, 59:9-11(b) (1971).
76. In comparison, a Sherman Act violation is a felony. In addition to a jail sen
tence of up to three years, fines may be imposed of $1,000,000 for corporations and
$100,000 for individuals. The Antitrust Procedure and Penalties Act of 1974, § 3, Pub.
L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706 (amending 14 U.S.C. § 1 (1976)).
77. In Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), the United States Su
preme Court endorsed the offensive use of collateral estoppel. This means that in a
subsequent action the defendant may be estopped from relitigating the same issues
raised in the prior suit if there had been a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
matters, even though mutuality of parties is not present. The California Supreme
Court declined to review a decision, R.E. Spriggs Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 94 Cal.
App. 3d 419, 156 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1024 (1980), that ap
plied offensive collateral estoppel to prior rulings by a state court and a federal
administrative agency, the FTC. Congress has recently enacted a law, Pub. L. No.
93-349, to assure that collateral estoppel may be applied in antitrust litigation, except
as to administrative agency decisions.
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of the provisions of this chapter" to bring a suit for actual damages
plus costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. 78
There is a considerable body of federal law interpreting this
specific language. To have standing, a plaintiff must satisfy each el
ement, namely that (1) he is a "person"79 (2) who has suffered anti
trust type injury80 (3) to his business or property81 (4) which was
proximately caused (5) by the illegal anticompetitive act. Once lia
bility has been established, the claimant must prove the fact of
damage or impact. 82 There is greater flexibility in proving the
amount of damages flowing from the antitrust injury than in prov
ing that one was injured by the anticompetitive act. While mere
speculation or guesswork is not permitted, "a just and reasonable
estimate of the damages based on relevant data" will be allowed. 83
Despite the lack of impediments to proving actual damages,
chapter 93 appears to discourage ancillary remedies such as treble
damages and attorneys' fees. If claimant establishes malicious in
tent, treble damages may be awarded as well as costs and reason
able attorneys' fees. 84 By comparison, the federal antitrust laws man
78. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). The judiciary has recognized private antitrust suits to
be the "bulwark of antitrust enforcement." Perma Life Muffiers, Inc. v. International
Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134,139 (1968). They represent about 95% of all antitru.st cases.
A report based on litigation in the Southern District of New York, recently issued by
the ABA, indicates that the typical private antitrust case involves vertical market rela
tionships, concerns financially smaller comp;lnies which are suing larger defendants,
will be dismissed or settled voluntarily 80% of the time, and lasts an average of 19
months. The "primary practices violations" found were, first, vertical dealer termina
tions or boycotts; second, major vertical price fixing and market allocation; and third,
exclusive dealing and tying arrangements. REPORT OF ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST
LAW, 946 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), at A-I (Jan. 10, 1980).
79. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
80. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
81. See note 71 supra.
82. There are essentially three different types of damages that a plaintiff may es
tablish: (1) Lost profits; (2) actual losses; and (3) goodwill or going concern value.
Farmington Dowel Prod. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61 (1st CiT. 1969).
83. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946); Story Parch
ment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
84. In a chapter 93A § 11 case, a successful plaintiff normally should recover
reasonable expert witness fees in addition to other costs and reasonable attorneys'
fees. Moreover, in determining the amount to be awarded for reasonable attorneys'
fees, the court should consider "the nature of the case and the issues presented, the
time and labor required, the amount of damages involved, the result obtained, the
experience, reputation and ability of the attorney, the usual price charged for sim
ilar services by other attorneys in the same area, and the amount of awards in
similar cases." Linthicum v. Archambault, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2661, 398 N.E.2d 482
(1979). See also Judge Freedman's opinion in HEW Corp. v. Tandy Corp., 480 F.
Supp. 758 (D. Mass. 1979). But see Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 366 Mass. 688,
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date automatic trebling. 85
Injunctive relief may also be obtained,86 although there is no
corresponding authorization for attorneys' fees. In contrast, a recent
amendment to the Clayton Act authorized the award of attorneys'
fees in federal actions. 87
Procedurally, a parens patriae action stays a private suit
brought under this chapter or chapter 93A if it involves the same
defendant and at least some of the same issues. Jurisdiction lies in
superior court and as a pendent claim in federal district court.
Venue lies in the county where the defendant resides or has its
principal place of business, or the county where the violation
occurred.
Unlike chapter 93A, there is no section liberalizing class action
requirements. Antitrust class action complaints, therefore, must
satisfy the stringent demands of rule 23 of the Massachusetts Rules of
Civil Procedure. 88 Since rule 23 mirrors the federal class action rule,
antitrust class actions under chapter 93 are likely to encounter the
same manageability, notice, and common question impediments ex
perienced by antitrust class actions89 initiated under the federal rule.
322 N.E.2d 768, 777 n.16 (1975), in which the Supreme Judicial Court indicated that
in its view the Massachusetts version of FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d) "seems to permit the
flexibility in notification of class members which, before the Eisen case [417 U.S.
156 (1974)] was decided, many commentators had urged be allowed under the fed
eral rule."
85. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). See Perma Life Muffiers, Inc. v. In
ternational Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
86. Section 16 imposes a lower threshold of standing than § 4 since the plaintiff
need only show threatened loss or damage rather than injury to business or property.
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972). Injunctive relief is authorized by
the Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976). In general, the federal courts have avail
able a broad range of equitable remedies. See United States v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 171 (1948); Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197
(1904).
87. 14 U.S.C. § 26 (1976), as amended by Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improve
ment Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976). Responding to the Su
preme Court's ruling that attorneys' fees cannot be awarded unless specifically au
thorized by statute, Alyeska Pipeline Servo Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240
(1975), Congress amended the Clayton Act to allow attorneys' fees in injunction ac
tions. Interpreting this amendment as a procedural change, the courts have applied it
retroactively. Alphin V. Henson, 552 F.2d 1033 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823
(1977). Attorneys' fees in an antitrust suit for preliminary injunctive relief were re
cently awarded in F. & M. Schaefer Corp. V. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 476 F. Supp.
203 (S.D.N.Y.), aIi'd, 597 F.2d 814 (2d Cir. 1979).
88. MASS. R. CIV. P. RULE 23(a).
89. Bernstein & Berger, Recent Developments in Private Antitrust Class Ac
tions, 24 N.Y. L. REV. 819 (1979).
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Section 13: Statute of Limitations

Conforming to federal antitrust laws and chapter 93A,90 the
statute of limitations91 is four years from the time the cause of ac
tion accrued. 92 In harmony with federal precedents, Massachusetts
courts are likely to construe continuing violations as accruing at the
time of the most recent illegal act. 93 As a result of this provision,
in appropriate factual situations a private plaintiff may recover
treble damages for the past four years. This multiplying effect can
be quite substantial. For example, if criminal damages equal
$10,000, the dollar recovery, if trebled, may be as much as
$120,000, exclusive of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.
The running of this statute is suspended during the pendency
of an action by the state and for one year thereafter. The toll, how
ever, apparently is restricted to four years.

L.

Section 14: Antitrust Enforcement Fund

Section 14 establishes an "Antitrust Enforcement Fund." De
posited in this Fund is money received by the state as a result of
the attorney general's antitrust enforcement efforts. It is to be
used solely to finance similar future litigation. A maximum deposi
tory of one million dollars is established, with any excess to benefit
the general fund.
The creation of this Fund assures that, despite the vicissitudes

90. The federal four-year statute of limitations has been held not to preempt the
state from enacting a longer statute of limitations and damage period. Ohio ex rel.
Brown v. Klosterman French Baking Co., [1977-1) TRADE CAS. (CCH) ~ 61,361 at
71,271 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
91. The two main purposes of a statute of limitations are to assure fairness to the
party sued by putting him on notice and to relieve courts of the burden of trying
state claims when a plaintiff has slept on his rights. Burnett v. New York Cent. RR.
Co., 380 U.S. 424 (1965).
92. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260, § 5A (West Cum.
Supp. 1980).
93. Mindful of the remedial and deterrent purpose of private antitrust enforce
ment, the federal courts have taken a pragmatic approach to statute of limitation is
sues. Greyhound Corp. v. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 437 U.S. 322 (1978). For example, it
is tolled by fraudulent concealment. Also, when there is a continuing violation the
cause of action accrues when an anticompetitive act injures the plaintiff, even though
there may be later injuries resulting from the same act. In most types of civil cases,
Massachusetts courts have been less permissive. For example, in a medical malprac
tice action the two-year statute of limitation was held to run from the time the physi
cian left the surgical instrument in the patient rather than when it was discovered.
Pasquale v. Chandler, 350 Mass. 450, 215 N.E.2d 319 (1966).
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of politics, the attorney general will have adequate resources to
pursue "big" cases, plan long-term policies, initiate major projects,
and develop a staff of antitrust specialists.
While providing these and other enumerated benefits, the
Fund nevertheless may present a conflict of interest. At some point
the attorney general may be faced with a choice between ac
cepting a settlement that substantially replenishes this bank ac
count or pursuing a judicially determined result.

Section 14A: Relation to Chapter 93A
Section 14A states that chapter 93 affects chapter 93A only to
the extent explicitly provided in that statute. As previously dis
cussed, this interdependent relationship is the result of a major
compromise reached by business and consumer groups. Its legal
consequences are significant. Chapter 93A is broader in its scope
than chapter 93. It not only reaches full-fledged anticompetitive
conduct, but also conduct which violates the spirit, if not the tech
nical letter, of the antitrust laws. 94 A claimant, therefore, may suc
cessfully litigate a chapter 93A unfair method of competition claim
while at the same time fail to prove a chapter 93 claim. Since nei
ther statute has been definitively interpreted, claimants at present
may elect to sue for violations of both in one action. 95
M.

N.

Notable Omissions

Chapter 93 does not address two subjects which have been the
focus of considerable federal antitrust activity: Price discrimination
and mergers. The Federal Robinson-Patman Act proscribes dis
criminatory pricing practices between different purchasers of com
modities of like grade, quality, and quantity where competition is
lessened. 96 Mergers which substantially lessen competition are pro
94. FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 324 (1966); Atlantic Refining Co. v.
FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 369-70 (1965).
95. The Attorney General has followed this procedure. See In re Levi Strauss &
Co., 901 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), at D-1 (Suffolk Super. Ct. 1979).
96. The Clayton Act § 2, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, ch. 592,
§ 1, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976). This statute has recently been described as "a
cOinpromise between conflicting, perhaps irreconcilable, policy objectives, the main
tenance of price competition for the benefit of the consumer and protection of
smaller business firms from competition. Subsequent uncertain and inconsistent in
terpretations of almost every provision of the Act have reflected its schizoid origins."
Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. of America, 471 F. Supp. 793 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). Several af
firmative defenses may be raised, such as meeting competition or cost justification.

1980]

MASSACHUSETTS ANTITRUST ACT

33

hibited by section 7 of the Clayton Act. 97 Both practices may also
violate section 5 of the FTC Act. 98
The legislative history indicates that the substantial omissions
in chapter 93 are intentional. The business community opposed the
inclusion of analogous provisions in chapter 93. The attorney gen
eral also did not support their addition. His position was founded
on the belief, propounded by many economists, that price dis
crimination is procompetitive and that merger prosecution is too
complex and expensive an undertaking for a fledgling enforcement
division. Other states have not reached the same conclusions. 99
Nevertheless, despite being omitted from chapter 93, price dis
crimination and anticompetitive mergers may be challenged as "un
fair methods of competition" in violation of chapter 93A.100
IV.

CONCLUSION

The past decade has witnessed the revival of state interest in
antitrust enforcement. Spurred by consumer support, federal finanSee United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978); Great At!. &
Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69 (1979).
97. 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1976); United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486
(1974); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (horizontal mer
gers); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) (vertical mergers);
United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973) and United States v.
Penn-Olin Chern. Co., 278 U.S. 158 (1964) (conglomerate mergers). These suits gen
erally involve complex analyses defining the relevant geographic and market lines.
98. See Beatrice Foods Co., 67 F.T.C. 473 (1965), modified by consent, [1967]
TRADE CAS. (CCH) ~ 72,124 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973)
(holding a violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act to be a violaion of § 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act). Pursuant to Title II of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Anti
trust Improvements Act of 1976, the FTC has issued premerger notification regula
tions, 16 C.F.R. § 800.1-.9 (1980). These apply to a ·wide variety of merger transac
tions and are designed to give the FTC and Justice Department adequate lead time
to examine the proposed merger's anticompetitive effect.
Section 5 has been construed to reach practices violating the spirit if not the let
ter of the Robinson-Patman Act. R.H. Macy & Co. v. FTC, 326 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.
1964), modifying and aff'g, 60 F.T.C. 1249 (1962); Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300
F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962), modifying and aff'g, 57 F.T.C. 382 (1960).
99. A number of states have not only enacted these provisions but have also
filed suits to enforce them. Recently California settled a pioneering state anti-merger
complaint. The defendant bowling alley operator agreed to divest itself of an ac
quired bowling alley and pay a $2,500 civil penalty. California v. Timberlanes of
Redding, Inc., 938 AI\'TITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), at D-l (Cal. S. Ct. 1979).
For a summary of state merger actions see [1979] 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 4460,
at 6873.
100. As such practices violate § 5 of the FTC Act, they also may be held to vio
late Massachusetts' corresponding "little" FTC Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A
(West Cum. Supp. 1980).
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cial assistance, and strengthened legislation, the states have in
creasingly pursued an active and at times innovative role as anti
trust prosecutors.
Massachusetts has joined this movement. By enacting chapter 93
the Commonwealth expressed its commitment to protect free and
unfettered competition in the business community. New procedur
al devices, rights, and remedies were created to assist this effort. De
spite these improvements chapter 93 remains less than satisfactory
as an antitrust tool. Substantial revisions are necessary if this Act is
to serve as a meaningful deterrent to violators of the antitrust laws.
The future portends continued if not increased state effort in
this area. Increased state activity means increased involvement by
lawyers representing local as well as national businesses. Antitrust
counseling, therefore, is likely to become a common adjunct to cor
porate lawyering.
It remains to be seen, however, to what extent chapter 93, as
presently drafted, will be used offensively as a source of rights for
business and consumer plaintiffs. The Act imposes serious proce
dural hurdles that add significantly to an already high threshold for
bringing complex antitrust litigation.
Chapter 93's provisions also appear to favor large national
companies, the most likely defendants in antitrust litigation. Not
only are the Act's jurisdictional and exemption sections unneces
sarily cumbrous, they also are drafted t~ favor large defendants.
The Act's definition section furthers this effect by excluding entire
categories of commercial conduct. Section 8' s confidentiality pro
tections remove a common means for private plaintiffs to acquire
evidence of wrongdoing by much larger companies. Without such
access they may be required to pursue lengthy, protracted, and
often futile discovery efforts. Clearly, large national companies are
more financially prepared to win this war of procedural procrastina
tion. Substantively, the Act excludes anticompetitive mergers and
price discrimination; both types of conduct are more likely to be
engaged in by big business. Furthermore, the injured parties in
. such actions are usually much smaller enterprises. Thus procedural
and substantive impediments may deter plaintiffs with valid actions
from bringing their claims and thus reinforce improper business ac
tivities.
Damages, the key to successful private antitrust enforcement,
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is another area where litigation difficulties may arise. Unlike the
federal antitrust laws, which automatically treble a successful plain
tiffs injuries, the Massachusetts Antitrust Act provides only for
recovery of actual damages. A plaintiff must prove the subjective
and slippery element of malicious intent to be awarded more than
single damages. Because the Act is a criminal statute, this mens
rea type burden is likely to be considerable. The incentive to bring
an antitrust suit is further diminished by the Act's failure to autho
rize the granting of reasonable attorneys' fees in injunction actions.
Since many small business antitrust suits are brought pursuant to
a contingent fee arrangement, this failure may chill the willing
ness of counsel to represent distributors, franchisees, and other
small companies faced, for example, with termination. As has been
noted, the federal antitrust laws were amended to rectify this un
warranted exclusion. Chapter 93 further discourages private suits
by consumers and small businesses against large companies by its
lack of a class action section comparable to the provision in chap
ter 93A.
All these factors militate against private enforcement efforts.
The major issue thus becomes what, if any, benefits chapter 93 of
fers to injured plaintiffs. The answer to this query is far from
clear. It may be speculated that chapter 93 may result in the re
covery of supplemental damages when incorPorated as a pendent
action in a federal antitrust suit. When joined with chapter 93A in
a state action, it may also afford a greater degree of certainty of the
potential outcome as there is considerable judicial case law defining
illegal conduct under the federal antitrust laws.
As in most federal private antitrust actions, chapter 93 cases
are likely to involve issues of price fixing, group boycotts, and
other per se violations. Cases alleging per se conduct are much
more appealing to the plaintiff antitrust practitioner than cases
challenging conduct that is subject to analysis under the rule of
reason. The former can be short and lucrative for plaintiff's attor
ney while the latter envisions extensive discovery and trial with at
tendant doubtful results.
As in the federal area, private antitrust suits may be expected
to follow in the wake of successful government actions. The Act's
provision that rulings in such government actions may be offered as
prima facie evidence of misconduct considerably reduces the bur
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den on private plaintiffs in subsequent litigation against the same
defendant. Offensive collateral estoppel offers even greater proce
dural benefits.
The Massachusetts Antitrust Act could be strengthened sig
nificantly by legislative redrafting. Sections 3 and 7 should be
rewritten to eliminate the Act's evident and unjustified loopholes.
They presently allow companies engaged in anticompetitive con
duct to escape the statute's prohibitions, thereby contravening the
Act's intent. Section 3 might be drafted to reach all violations
which have significant local consequences. Section 7 might immu
nize only anticompetitive conduct mandated by and actively super
vised by a federal or state agency, or preempted or in conflict with
federal law. The remedies section should also be strengthened. 101
Damages should be trebled in a mandatory fashion. Violations
should be made felonies. Consideration should also be given to
other more innovative penalties such as corporate charter revoca
tion. 102 Other procedural and substantive provisions should be
added to permit prosecution of anticompetitive mergers, suits by
indirect purchasers, and class action relief. 103
The concept of federalism encourages each state to grapple
with national problems and to develop its own innovative solutions.
A number of states have responded to this opportunity by enacting
strong, comprehensive antitrust laws. Massachusetts has long been
in the forefront of the movement to enact public interest legisla
tion. It should resume this leadership position by adopting a
sound, fair, and effective state antitrust law. The increasing eco
nomic pressures on business likely to prevail during the 1980's will
require a strong state and private effort to protect Massachusetts
citizens from the evils of anticompetitive business conduct. Since

101. The state may enact different and stronger remedy provisions without cre
ating an unconstitutional conflict with federal law. See Connecticut v. Levi Strauss &
Co., 471 F. Supp. 363 (D. Conn. 1979).
102. These remedies might include permanently barring a company from doing
business in the state, Texas v. The Scott & Fetzer Co., 933 ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA), at D-5 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 1979), or requiring restitution to consumers
injured by price-fixing, Colorado v. Torbuc Corp., 941 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA), at D-l (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1979).
103. See The Cartwright Act, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16750(a) (Deering
1976), as amended by Stats. 1978, ch. 536, § 1. See also California & Hawaiian Sugar
Co. v. California, 588 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932 (1979), in
which the Ninth Circuit held that although no claim under federal law existed after
application of Illinois Brick, there may still be a claim under California law.
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chapter 93 does not presently contain the legal weapons,104 the
legislature should promptly act by amending the statute to incorpo
rate these legal tools.
104. As the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed in California Retail Liquor Deal
ers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 100 S. Ct. 937 (1980): "Antitrust laws in general,
and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are
as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system
as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms." Id.
at 946 (quoting United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972)).

